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Abstract—Authenticating web identities with TLS certificates
is a typical problem whose security depends on both technical
and human aspects, and that needs, to be fully grasped, a
socio-technical analysis. We performed such an analysis, and
in this paper we comment on the tools and methodology we
found appropriate. We first analysed the interaction ceremonies
between users and the most used browsers in the market. Then
we looked at user’s understanding of those interactions. Our
tools and our methodology depend on whether the user model
has a non-deterministic or a realistic behaviour. We successfully
applied formal methods in the first case. In the second, we had
to define a security framework consistent with research methods
of experimental cognitive science.
Index Terms—Socio-Technical Security, Ceremony Analysis,
Human Computer Interaction
I. INTRODUCTION
Let us assume you are meeting a person that is expected to
do some job for you. You know nothing about him except a
few things such as his name and affiliation. How can you trust
a stranger introducing himself and claiming to be that person?
This “are you a friend or a foe?” problem boils down to
assessing the validity of an identity. Plenty of solutions have
been proposed to solve it; a few require sharing passwords
beforehand (which is feasible only rarely) and the majority
requiring a certain degree of trust. For example, trust is
required when the stranger shows a document vouching his
identity, because you need to trust the authority that has
issued the document you are given. This problem of assessing
someone’s identity is exactly that which, on the Internet, a
browser faces when it asks a server to authenticate itself. Here,
the proof has the form of a Transport Layer Security (TLS)
certificate, which, to be valid, should be ultimately signed
by an authority that the browser recognises as trustworthy.
Indeed, if all certificates were signed by world-wide known
and unquestionably honest authorities the role of trust would
be negligible: no trust is required when there is full knowledge
and control of events. Such a situation is unrealistic for TLS-
based authentication (e.g., see [1]), and therefore, someone,
somewhere, has to decide whether to trust an entity to be
honest or not. But users do not usually have the understanding
and security knowledge to take secure decisions. In TLS
certificate validation users can be asked to take such decisions,
for instance, when a server presents a self-signed certificate.
A self-signed certificate is issued and signed by the server
itself. Thus, to trust a self-signed certificate one should trust
the server already, which is a useless circular reasoning. What
solutions are available that help security with self-signed TLS?
The protocol that is responsible for the validation of certificates
does not give answers: for TLS, self-signed certificates are
technically unverifiable and thus “MUST either notify the user
(clients MAY give the user the opportunity to continue with
the connection in any case) or terminate the connections” [2].
This recommendation has been picked up by browsers that
implement it in various ways; but since so many Internet frauds
still happen, a reliable standard solution seems yet to be found.
Frauds can happen when users are involved in security
decisions as, these can be very complex to explain and under-
stand. Preferably users should better not take such decisions,
as suggested in [3], but for the problem of validating an
identity on the Internet this seems not possible: in particular
the question whether to trust a self-signed certificate is a
process that is inherently socio-technical, for it is made of
interactions between users, user interfaces, browsers, and even
servers. Its security should be analysed by considering all those
components and their interaction.
TLS technical security has been intensively studied (e.g.,
see [4], [5]), as well its usability (e.g., [6], [7], [8])) but a
framework for a combined socio-technical security analysis
still does not exist. In such a framework, system models should
comprise not only technical but also social/human components;
security depends on how these components interact and coop-
erate, because it is this collaboration that builds or undermines
security. Since traditional security has mainly focused on the
technical perspective, socio-technical security is a new frontier,
which needs to be tackled.
Contribution. This paper proposes and follows such an
innovative approach to security. It discusses a framework for
socio-technical security analysis and a suitable threat model,
and applies it to study two relevant problems with TLS
certificate validation and self-signed certificates. The first is (a)
the analysis of the interaction ceremonies between users and
the most famous browsers in the market. The second problem
is (b) the analysis of the understanding that users have about
how TLS works. This latter study is still to be completed.
The here-proposed framework needs first to be instantiated into
research methods proper of cognitive science. From these two
studies we gained valuable knowledge about tools that can be
realistically applied for socio-technical analysis of security.
Structure. Section II presents the socio-technical security
analysis model. Section III describes the security analysis ap-
plied from the “Computer” to the “Network” layer; Section IV
describes the needed HCI (Human Computer Interaction)
methods and research processes to perform that same anal-
ysis, specifically between the “Human” and the “Computer”
layers. Section V comments the related work, and Section VI
discusses the obtained results, presents some future work, and
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II. SOCIO-TECHNICAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
Our focus on socio-technical security compels us to revise
traditional analysis techniques. Depending on the objective of
the analysis, in fact, we may need different methodologies and
tools. An analysis focusing on the technical side (communi-
cating processes, applications and interfaces), with attackers
controlling the networks or the interfaces, usually requires
tools to reason about the behaviour of software components.
Conversely one addressing the social side (persona and user
behaviour) may require a research methodology to observe and
reason about users interacting with the system.
We are interested in defining a framework where to model
and analyse these two aspects together i.e., a system’s social
and technical components, in an integrated manner. We de-
scribe here a variant of Bella et al.’s concertina model [9].
Therein Alice and Bob are not metaphors for communicating
processes, as in traditional protocol security, but personae
linked to a set of interaction layers that connect humans and
computers and, via the network, them with other computers
and users (see Fig. 1). All the procedural elements that concern
Alice, subscripted with an A, are drawn on the left side. The
interactions between those elements are represented in grey
boxes. The full description of these elements is given in [9];
here we recall that SA is Alice’s self, that expresses Alice’s
persona in a specific situation, PA. It can be for example
Alice at work. UIA is an abstraction for all the interfaces that
she uses to interact with the networked application pA. This
application interacts, through the network, with pB , the only
element of the here incomplete Bob’s side. (Bob’s side can
have the same layered structure as Alice’s.) Our variant (see
Fig. 1) has also (1) a context, CA; and (2) a threat model (black
triangles). Context is a complementary element that affects
our system’s interactions, especially the user’s interactions, for
example, how often or with which probability, a user acts in
a certain fashion. Context could be the user’s physical space,
such when visiting the university of Luxembourg (UNILU),
which influences user’s perception of security when receiving
an invalid certificate warning from a web site in the “uni.lu”
domain, versus one with domain “med.up.pt”. As a threat
model we assume an intruder who controls, not only the
network, as in the classical Dolev-Yao model [10], but also
the interactions between the application, the user interfaces,
the persona, and the context. The places where the attacker can
strike are indicated as black triangles. The intruder’s abilities
are however as in the traditional Dolev-Yao model, with the
adjunct ability of creating new interfaces with the elements he
interacts with. By acting with a wider variety of interactions
as well as with the context, the intruder can influence both the
technical components and the user behaviour.
In our model, security depends thus on what happens across
the layers, and its analysis results richer: we therefore talk of
socio-technical security analysis.
In the sequel, we introduce the methodologies and tools
that we have selected to analyse socio-technical security
systems and evaluate/comment on those selected tools in
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Fig. 1. The multi-layered security and threat model. Arrows are possible at-
tacks. The intruder can control context, interaction, events between application
and user interface, and the network.
two studies concerning socio-technical understanding of the
security of TLS certificate validation. We have successfully
applied formal methods (model checking) when considering
layers from “network” until “computer”, and when assuming
users behave non-deterministically. This confirms Martina and
Carlos’s assertion that formal methods are useful to analyse
security ceremonies [11]. To study instead security with more
realistic user models we had to look into research methods
of human-computer interaction (HCI) and cognitive science
practices; as, to our knowledge, there is no framework for
security analysis in those practices, we had to define one.
III. STUDY 1 - TLS CERTIFICATE VALIDATION
From Sect. I we recall that a necessary condition for a
server’s identity to be authenticated is that the browser verifies
the server’s TLS certificate. If it cannot, because, for example,
the certificate is self signed, the success of authentication may
depend on the user: a browser can ask him to decide whether
to proceed or abort the session.
In this study we analysed four of the most popular browsers
– Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Opera Mini – and
how they interact with users when they encounter a self-signed
certificate. Since the four browsers run different engines (i.e.,
pA) and ceremonies with users (i.e., interactions between PA
and UIA), the analysis of the structure of the dialogue browser-
user is rich in possibilities.
This analysis (cf. Fig. 2) is about the layers that span from
pB (server) to PA (user). In fact, we modelled a server, a
browser, an abstraction of the interface, and a simple model
of a user who chooses non-deterministically among the options
that are offered to him. Context is not necessary here, for the
simple model of users is context-independent.
We tried different formalisms to model the entities in
agreement with our multi-layered security model. We first used
flow charts but, although intuitive, this formalism was not the
best to model multi-layered interactions, aside from the fact
that they lack formal semantics, a limitation that precludes
any formal analysis. We thus chose UML activity diagrams,
a fortunate choice for three reasons. They fit well with the
layered representation, they give immediately an easy reading
of TLS sessions (i.e., a quick glance at the diagrams of the
browsers under study shows clearly their different validation
mechanisms), and they can be easily translated into a formal
HUMAN︷ ︸︸ ︷ COMPUTER︷ ︸︸ ︷ NETWORK︷ ︸︸ ︷
H
SA express PA interaction UIA events pA protocol pB
Fig. 2. The multi-layered security and threat model used in Study 1. There
is no context. The intruder is a man-in-the-middle.
3language. We built the diagrams of Chrome and Firefox by
looking at their official documentation and code. Internet
Explorer and Opera Mini are closed-source, so we studied
them empirically.
The pictures show a combination of mechanisms: Chrome
complies with HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) policy
–a policy whereby a web server announces using only HTTPS–
, Internet Explorer uses warnings extensively, Firefox is the
most complete having a complex engine and elaborate user
interactions, and Opera Mini clearly aims at being lightweight
(as is designed for mobile platforms).
While modelling them in UML, we did not describe their
full functionalities but limited them to how each browser
treats certificate validation. Because of space limitations we
only show here the Chrome diagram (Fig. 3). Our diagrams
have four columns each representing communicating elements.
Three are entities: User, Browser, and Server. Browser distin-
guishes two standard sub-entities: User Interface and Engine.
Entities have a begin circle that points to their first activity.
Thick arrows depict the flow of activities among different
entities, while thin arrows stand for the internal entity flow.
Arrow labels define the objects that are exchanged between
activities. Some activities need to access data-stores, which
are linked to activities via dashed arrows. Most activities are
self-explanatory and common to all browser diagrams, such
as Display Webpage and Type/Click URL. To keep the focus
on the browser, the server activities are reduced to Init.TLS,
whereby the server starts the TLS handshake on its side, and
Finish TLS, where it concludes the handshake. There is no
room to describe in further detail the diagram, but it can be
easily understood with a basic UML background.
To carry on the analysis we coded the UML diagram in
a variant of CSP (Communicating Sequential Processes) [12]
called CSP#; however, a prototyped tool that translates UML
activity diagrams in CSP will be available soon [13], a tool we
would like to test in the future. We also modelled an intruder,
a Dolev-Yao controlling the network, and the user. Capturing
the complexities of user behaviour by a formal model is a
challenging open issue. As explained in the introduction, we
modelled the user as a non-deterministic process: this is the
weakest assumption about the user skills: a ceremony that is
secure for a non-deterministic user, is also secure for any user.
The last step of our prototype methodology consisted in
defining relevant security properties. We identified four socio-
technical properties that bind TLS session, validation mecha-
nisms, and user choices. We expressed them in linear temporal
logic. One property is meant to evaluate the user involvement:
it assesses whether the browser always warns the user when
certificate validation fails. Two properties aim to evaluate
whether the mechanisms that browsers adopt to manage failed
certificate validations protect users from man-in-the-middle
(MIM) attacks (e.g., if browsers can prevent users accessing
a page controlled by the intruder). The last property is about
informing the user that a MIM attack might have occurred in
previous TLS sessions.
We verified the properties with the PAT (Process Analysis
Toolkit) model checker [14]. The most interesting results re-
gard Firefox. PAT reports a trace showing that Firefox does not
warn the user when a certificate validation fails. This is due to
the drawbacks of storing server certificates permanently, which
Firefox allows its users to do. Moreover, it is worth noting that
no browser keeps records of past warnings, exposing users to
vulnerabilities when they bootstrap with MIM. This finding
suggests a novel, more secure, strategy for browsers. Browsers
should maintain a cache of invalid certificate hashes. In doing
so, it would be possible for browsers to warn users when a
different invalid certificate is presented by a server with which
the browser has communicated in the past. Looking into this
strategy is a matter of future work.
IV. STUDY 2 - HUMAN BEHAVIOURAL MODEL
This second study is on-going work on the layers that go
from UIA to SA, thus it focuses on the human facing several
options proposed by the computer. Studying user behaviour
requires tools and research methods commonly employed in
experimental psychology like surveys, diaries, focus-groups,
interviews or non-interfering observations in a laboratory set-
ting. By using those methods we do not intend to create
a model of human behaviour, but rather to understand both
quantitative (e.g., find whether patterns of secure/insecure
behaviour exist) and qualitative aspects (e.g., explain those
patterns) of human behaviour with regard to socio-technical
attacks.
In our multi-layered security and threat model, we assume
that socio-technical attacks may strike as indicated in Fig. 1.
To study how users behave therein, we use the traditional
hypothetical-deductive research process [15] that we have re-
adapted to our needs.
The process starts when we define a hypothesis about an
attack scenario. Starting from the multi-layered security and
threat model, we identify key components such as the user
(i.e., Human side), the application (i.e., Computer side), the
context and the attack (and eventually some defence). Attack
and Defence may compete: the former pushing users to an
insecure behaviour, the latter, if present, to a secure behaviour.
To clarify the roles of the components and how they relate
to one another during an attack scenario, we give every
component a state and the possibility to act with input/output
actions according to a Behaviour Control Process (BCP). A
component’s state is its being in a certain moment that will be
used by the BCP to determine the next action to perform (like
communicating/interacting with another component, changing
its own state or even doing nothing). The state, like the BCP,
can be very complex and we may not be able to formalize
them fully. For instance, a browser integrates code acting as
BCP (as seen in Section III) but we do not have an equivalent
for the user, we can only inquire properties of the resulting
behaviour by observing it during a laboratory experiment.
A hypothesis about potential patterns in user behaviours and
the role of the different components is thus expressed using
our model Fig. 4. Insights regarding the human behaviour can
be gained from human information processing models, the
decision taking research domain, error modeling and so on.
The analysis of some traces of socio-technical attacks issued
by incident response teams can also be a relevant source of
information regarding the attack scenario.
4Fig. 3. Activity diagram for TLS certificate validation in Chrome
From this preliminary work the researcher will be able to
choose the methodology that suits best the elicited hypothesis.
The most important will be to define what is considered
a secure behaviour in the following experiments, how this
will be observed and what methodologies will be used to
query the qualitative aspects of this behaviour. Those questions
addressed, we will be able to design and implement the
experiment to run.
As this study is still ongoing work we cannot contextualize
the framework in a research process, but we can instantiate
it to describe an attack scenario. We demonstrate the use
of this framework by considering an attack against the TLS
certificate verification in Google Chrome. We know that users
already ignore 60% of Interstitial Warnings (IW) in Google
Chrome [16] and this rate may increase if an Attack changes
the user’s state just before he makes a choice among the
options UIA offers him. By ignoring, we mean that users
prefer to choose the option “Proceed anyway” and then store
the self-signed certificate, over “Go back to safety” (equivalent
to the back action) and closing the tab. An Attack controlling
the user interface (i.e., Man-in-The-Browser) can send some
specially crafted information (i.e., the payload) in order to
force the user (BCP) to deviate from the prescribed (i.e.,
secure) behaviour. In Fig. 4 we see that the attack strikes in the
PA. UIA interaction. We consider the application “Warning”
being all the “Computer” layers until UIA and the user being
all the “Human” layers until PA.
Here we choose to convey the payload by a fake IW which
will be shown before the genuine one. The payload aims at
misleading the user in interpreting a self-signed certificate as
SELF-signed certificate, that is “certificate signed by S.E.L.F.”,
where SELF is a new certification authority yet unknown by
the user’s browser, but introducing itself as trusted in the text
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Fig. 4. The multi-layered security and threat model used in Study 2.
of the IW. This introduces a polysemy on the word “self”
that may lead the user to misinterpret the meaning of the
word (called equivocation fallacy e.g. “The sign said “fine for
parking here”, and since it was fine, I parked here.”).
As presented by the Sequence Diagram in Fig. 5, the fake
IW only offers a “continue” action that leads to the genuine
one. The genuine warning offers the option to bring the user
back to the fake interstitial warning (loop) or to store the self-
signed certificate (then the attack succeeds). The only way for
the user to escape this loop and make the attack fail is to hit
the browser’s close button at any time or to hit the back button
when he is on the fake IW.
The context CA does not actively play a role in this attack
scenario but could be used by a defence (see the empty arrow
in Fig. 4). For instance, in addition to the explanations the
Genuine Warning given to the user, a link to some education /
information material could be proposed. This could affect the
user’s state and change his following behaviour, hopefully to
one that tends to be more secure.
After having been clearly defined, the attack scenario is
implemented. The implementation heavily relies on the choice
of some tools. If the attack uses software, such as a phishing
attack, then we need a software tool to implement and launch
it; if the attack is of the social-engineering kind, implementing
it will probably mean to train an actor. In the case of this
5Fig. 5. Sequence diagram for the studied attack scenario. We use alternatives
this way to emphasize the needed actions to make the attack fail or succeed.
The possible use of the Context CA as a defence is not represented here for
the sake of simplicty.
attack scenario, it is fairly easy to design a fake IW from the
Chromium’s source code. A tool like BeEF [17] could also
come handy to reproduce experiments amoung the participants.
To test any hypothesis about how people resist such mislead-
ing inputs we need to instantiate the whole research process
(e.g., to decide how to launch the attack, what and how
to observe, what to ask users afterwards, etc.) and to run
the corresponding experiments. Then we could observe the
patterns that lead users to resist or to fall for the attack and
try to explain those patterns with the analysis of the qualitative
investigations. This is future work that we plan to do in the
usability laboratory.
V. RELATED WORK
In this section we present some related work that has also
focused on the security analysis and usability of browser
security warnings and, in particular, of TLS certificates. There
is much work available on the analysis of the TLS protocol
but we only refer to two recent works which summarise most
security problems. SSL/TLS certificate validation has many
implementation vulnerabilities specially in e-commerce web-
sites [5]. This paper analyses SSL/TLS certificate validation in
non-browser applications. In addition, little attention is paid to
the problem of correctly authenticating the service provider by
the users. Josang’s et al. work [4] tries to develop a framework
to provide for user authentication assurance. However, these
researchers do not focus on the fact that a user authenticating
the service provider will provide more ways to perform socio-
technical attacks. Attackers will probably focus even more
on social engineering to implement successful attacks. These
authors’ main conclusion is that it is essential to integrate user
and server authentication in the same framework. So to devise
a platform where both socio and technical aspects of TLS
security can be developed and implemented together. We also
share this view.
Works about security usability and browser warnings con-
clude that users do not look at browsers’ cues or security
indicators and that they are lead to the incorrect decision in
40 percent of the time [18]. Some works try to improve user’s
awareness, for example with visual augmented security [19]
which informs users about security decisions or even with im-
proved interaction techniques to prevent spoofing [20]. These
are small improvements as visual deception attacks can fool
knowledgeable users even when these are alert to find security
problems [18]. Sunshine’s et al. [8] further concludes that even
custom/improved warnings are not enough and ideally security
designers should avoid them altogether.
For a more integrated security analysis of the socio-technical
aspects in general, we could not find much research available,
much less even for the TLS authentication scenario. As already
mentioned, Cranor’s work [3] introduces a generic framework
to reason about the human in the loop regarding security to
help system’s designers to avoid mistakes within the communi-
cations between several system’s components. However, it does
not focus on analysing and implementing socio-technical at-
tacks. Other research has been done to develop socio-technical
frameworks to anticipate organizational threats [21] or define
warning systems for socio-technical incidents [22]. It is not
referred what will happen if some non-specified vulnerability
is exploited or how they would change their procedures in
order to mitigate and help the user to avoid these in practice,
as we plan to do in future research.
VI. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
We presented a framework for analysing socio-technical
security of systems, and applied it to study the TLS certifi-
cate validation and self-signed certificates. The multi-layered
security and threat analysis model presented in this paper
can express and integrate socio-technical interactions for all
components within the system in analysis together with the
context where that system is set. As is common knowledge,
security can include several layers, and if we miss one of them,
we can be opening vulnerability doors where those layers can
be compromised. If we are able to see the whole picture
and include the whole system (both human and technical)
in the security analysis, it will help us find and tackle more
vulnerabilities between all the involved elements.
Human intervention is central to the success/failure of an
attack, specially in the scenario of TLS certificate validation.
This problem needs to be tackled first at the level of under-
standing. If users do not understand the concepts for which
they are being asked to act upon, then their security decisions
may not be based on true assumptions. How to address this
situation? Training users? Improve warnings and messages in
a way users can both read them and gain a good understanding
of security protocols (can both be achieved)? Or simply accept
users do not need to fully understand security protocols? Also,
if users are in different states of mind regarding the concept
of certificates, maybe the experiment with the presented socio-
technical attack can generate richer and more close to reality
data. This could help us encounter different patterns of be-
haviour regarding a user’s personal context and characteristics
to define better ways to apply defences to such types of attacks.
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certificate validation (i.e., UML, PAT, CSP) were adequate
and helpful in expressing and evaluating in detail the security
analysis and properties of the different browsers in study.
The introduced multi-layered model helped us to identify,
not only the events and protocols between computer and
network components, but also the interactions between the
human user (PA) and the user interface (UIA). With the
obtained expressiveness it is easier and quicker to identify
inconsistencies and vulnerabilities in the security properties
which can be further corrected.
Regarding Study 2, the same multi-layered model helped us
to identify where attacks and defences could be applied for
both generic socio-technical attacks as well as socio-technical
attacks for the described scenario. By focusing the security
analysis within the interactions between (PA) and (UIA) and
the context where they are set, a common attack was easy
to define. In addition, some defence that can be used to
tackle those attacks was also introduced. Of course this is still
theoretical, but using the HCI research process where we base
our socio-technical studies, this defence can be evaluated in
practice with real user experiments. Again UML was useful to
express this socio-technical security analysis.
Another important contribution of this paper is that it
introduces the concept of context, which is many times ignored
in security analysis as is usually hard to define. However,
within socio-technical security analysis, the context is a very
important component which cannot be ignored because it can
influence the user’s set of mind when he is taking security de-
cisions [23]. The context is external to the system components’
interactions but can interfere with all of them, and so is even
more relevant to be included in system security analysis. For
socio-technical vulnerabilities, attackers use many times the
context where the system is set to influence or press the user
into falling for their attack. In the same way, our research can
be used to find out if defences can similarly use the context
to influence and help the user identifying and avoiding such
attacks.
The presented framework is still ongoing research but it can
already help us to instantiate with detail, and depending on the
attack scenario, the several layers that integrate the security
system to be analysed. More importantly, users may act
differently when in different contexts (e.g. usability laboratory,
at work or at home) [23]. Experiments must be designed so
that context is a crucial part of the study, as presented in this
paper with our multi-layered security analysis model.
Future work will include the performance and evaluation of
the presented socio-technical attack scenario with users, and
hopefully extract from these a set of user interaction patterns
which will help us better understand why users commonly fall
victims for the attacks that relate with TLS and self-signed
certificates. More importantly, with such an integrated model,
it will be possible to define socio-technical defences, which
can be applied at several layers of the system’s interactions, in
similar ways as a socio-technical attack is performed. The main
goal is to help the users to act in a behaviour more resilient
to socio-technical attacks by reverting or interfering with the
techniques that such an attack can use to deceive a user. Similar
techniques can be used successfully but in a reversed manner
to make the users better identify the risks that can be involved
in their actions and, hopefully, “defend” themselves.
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